Indian schools deploy virtual desktops to cut costs
Schools in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh have deployed NComputing virtual desktops technology, which distributes the power of a PC across a number of users.
The project, commissioned in November, aimed to bring computer training and e-learning to 5,000 government schools with 1.8 million students. Four months later, the schools have each been equipped with a computer lab with the hardware and software, trained instructors and a reliable power supply, NComputing said on Monday.
PCs currently in the market are so powerful that the vast majority of students only use a small fraction of the computer's capacity, according to the company. Its strategy is to utilize the excess capacity in a PC by sharing it among a number of users. As the client device is not the PC, but a monitor with keyboard and mouse, the economics of delivering computing to users changes dramatically, according to the company.
NComputing said in October that it would be using a version of its technology that would be priced at US$70 per seat, and in addition provide savings in electricity costs. A full deployment including shared cost of the computer, monitor, keyboard and peripherals cost would be closer to $200.
The systems run on the Microsoft Windows Server operating system and use Microsoft's Office Suite.
A number of technology companies including Intel and the One Laptop Per Child association are targeting specialized products at price-sensitive emerging markets.
The Indian government has said it has a prototype of a low-cost access and computing device for education purposes that can run the office suite from OpenOffice.org, besides offering users the ability to do browsing. The device, whose full specifications are still not available, is likely to be priced initially at $20 to $30, with plans to bring the price down to $10 at high volumes, an official in India's Department of Higher Education said earlier this month.
NComputing said it is working with nearly 15 states in India to pilot or implement its virtual desktop computing technologies.
source:http://www.networkworld.com/news/2009/022309-indian-schools-deploy-virtual-desktops.html
Wednesday, February 25, 2009
Tuesday, February 17, 2009
paidContent.org - Why Digital Music Companies And The Labels Have So Much Trouble Getting Along
YouTube and Sony (NYSE: SNE) Music Entertainment reached an agreement last week on a music-sharing deal, providing a welcome break from the nasty back and forth between Warner Music and the video behemoth over their collapsed deal. The Sony/YouTube agreement will provide music videos for all to see and presumably will make money for both parties. So why aren't the labels and digital startups (not just YouTube, but others as well) inking more deals? The answer lies in how the deals are usually structured and the way that the two sides approach the negotiating table. (I know a little bit about this subject, having founded a music company and been involved in negotiating sessions over the same types of rights.)
First, the details of the deals, which for the past few years have consisted of the following terms:
The digital company makes large upfront payments to the label (aka advances)?millions of dollars in the case of a company the size of YouTube?that are recouped as revenue from ads sold on the streams.
?The record label receives a penny for every stream whether or not advertising is sold on the content. Recently I've heard that this has fallen to an eighth of a cent because of the economy.
?If advertising is sold on the content, the two parties split the revenue 50/50 after the original penny a stream is paid to the label.
More after the jump...
To understand the implications of these terms for closing deals, consider the penny-per-stream component. It amounts to $10 per 1,000 streams, or a $10 CPM. This means that before the digital company makes any money on advertising it would have to pay the first $10 of the ultimate CPM to the labels, then split what's left 50/50. So, if YouTube were to sell a $20 CPM pre-roll on a music video, it would give the first $10 to the label then keep $5 of the remaining money. That's $15 to the label and $5 to YouTube, or an effective CPM of $5 on a pre-roll ad. That's not going to leave YouTube rolling in revenue, never mind profits. Throw in the fact that it has to pay millions of dollars upfront, and you can see why these talks are so strained.
Then, there is the mindset of each side in the negotiations.
Record labels point to their past negotiations with Apple (NSDQ: AAPL) as a mistake they don't want to make again. When Steve Jobs created iTunes he forced the labels to sell their music one song at a time, compensating the labels with 70 percent of the revenue. Seems reasonable, but, as many people know, Apple stock soared to new heights, while label stocks tanked amid the tidal wave of digital music and piracy. This time the labels are making sure they get paid more handsomely. Also driving the labels' negotiating position is that they put a lot of resources into their artists?and take sizable risks on them?but just one in 10 succeed. So they expect guaranteed payments, and healthy returns, from the digital deals on the artists who do succeed. Otherwise, digital companies could simply sit back and cherry pick the best artists at great prices, monetizing their business while labels take all the development risk. Digital companies, meanwhile, believe the labels kill dynamic businesses through greed and a lack of sophistication. On his company's earnings call last week, Real Networks CEO Rob Glaser blamed them for "stifling innovation." Jason Herskowitz of the recently shuttered Total Music, a mobile music site funded by the labels, had this to say on his blog last week: "All of the famished participants have to sit at the table?and be content to let all the others have a little bit to eat, even though they are still hungry themselves."
YouTube will probably reach deals with at least two other labels (Warner remains a question mark). But more broadly, the labels and digital startups don't seem to know how to get along. Meanwhile, each side is considering alternative business models that don't depend on the other for success. Digital businesses like YouTube are focusing more on original programming and webisodes rather than music videos, even though music videos remain the most-watched content on the site. Record labels have been discussing creating their own "Hulu-Style" online video site, but have themselves been involved in difficult negotiations about how to divvy up that pie.
Explaining why these talks are so tortured is one thing?finding a solution that satisfies both parties is another. But there are things that each side could do to break this logjam. In a follow-up piece next week, I'll explore some of them.
source:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/17/AR2009021701753.html
YouTube and Sony (NYSE: SNE) Music Entertainment reached an agreement last week on a music-sharing deal, providing a welcome break from the nasty back and forth between Warner Music and the video behemoth over their collapsed deal. The Sony/YouTube agreement will provide music videos for all to see and presumably will make money for both parties. So why aren't the labels and digital startups (not just YouTube, but others as well) inking more deals? The answer lies in how the deals are usually structured and the way that the two sides approach the negotiating table. (I know a little bit about this subject, having founded a music company and been involved in negotiating sessions over the same types of rights.)
First, the details of the deals, which for the past few years have consisted of the following terms:
The digital company makes large upfront payments to the label (aka advances)?millions of dollars in the case of a company the size of YouTube?that are recouped as revenue from ads sold on the streams.
?The record label receives a penny for every stream whether or not advertising is sold on the content. Recently I've heard that this has fallen to an eighth of a cent because of the economy.
?If advertising is sold on the content, the two parties split the revenue 50/50 after the original penny a stream is paid to the label.
More after the jump...
To understand the implications of these terms for closing deals, consider the penny-per-stream component. It amounts to $10 per 1,000 streams, or a $10 CPM. This means that before the digital company makes any money on advertising it would have to pay the first $10 of the ultimate CPM to the labels, then split what's left 50/50. So, if YouTube were to sell a $20 CPM pre-roll on a music video, it would give the first $10 to the label then keep $5 of the remaining money. That's $15 to the label and $5 to YouTube, or an effective CPM of $5 on a pre-roll ad. That's not going to leave YouTube rolling in revenue, never mind profits. Throw in the fact that it has to pay millions of dollars upfront, and you can see why these talks are so strained.
Then, there is the mindset of each side in the negotiations.
Record labels point to their past negotiations with Apple (NSDQ: AAPL) as a mistake they don't want to make again. When Steve Jobs created iTunes he forced the labels to sell their music one song at a time, compensating the labels with 70 percent of the revenue. Seems reasonable, but, as many people know, Apple stock soared to new heights, while label stocks tanked amid the tidal wave of digital music and piracy. This time the labels are making sure they get paid more handsomely. Also driving the labels' negotiating position is that they put a lot of resources into their artists?and take sizable risks on them?but just one in 10 succeed. So they expect guaranteed payments, and healthy returns, from the digital deals on the artists who do succeed. Otherwise, digital companies could simply sit back and cherry pick the best artists at great prices, monetizing their business while labels take all the development risk. Digital companies, meanwhile, believe the labels kill dynamic businesses through greed and a lack of sophistication. On his company's earnings call last week, Real Networks CEO Rob Glaser blamed them for "stifling innovation." Jason Herskowitz of the recently shuttered Total Music, a mobile music site funded by the labels, had this to say on his blog last week: "All of the famished participants have to sit at the table?and be content to let all the others have a little bit to eat, even though they are still hungry themselves."
YouTube will probably reach deals with at least two other labels (Warner remains a question mark). But more broadly, the labels and digital startups don't seem to know how to get along. Meanwhile, each side is considering alternative business models that don't depend on the other for success. Digital businesses like YouTube are focusing more on original programming and webisodes rather than music videos, even though music videos remain the most-watched content on the site. Record labels have been discussing creating their own "Hulu-Style" online video site, but have themselves been involved in difficult negotiations about how to divvy up that pie.
Explaining why these talks are so tortured is one thing?finding a solution that satisfies both parties is another. But there are things that each side could do to break this logjam. In a follow-up piece next week, I'll explore some of them.
source:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/17/AR2009021701753.html
Thursday, February 05, 2009
UNITED STATES: Obama's strategy shapes stimulus debate
The House of Representatives last week passed an 819 billion dollar economic stimulus bill, which was notable for the unusually partisan character of the vote: the entire Republican caucus opposed it, while all but eleven Democrats voted in favor. The Senate is now debating its own version of the bill, which has swelled to over 900 billion dollars. In theory, the Republicans have the votes to filibuster the package. In practice, the administration is in a strong position to secure its objectives.
Weak Senate opposition. Republican opposition in the Senate is potentially a more serious danger to President Barack Obama's economic stimulus plan than in the House, where the minority has little leverage. Senate rules allow a disciplined opposition to effectively block ('filibuster') legislation if it can deny the majority the 60 votes (out of 100) necessary to secure 'cloture' and end debate. However, Senate Republican leaders have not threatened to engage in such tactics -- nor are they likely to do so in the coming weeks, for several reasons:
Obama's intimidating popularity. Most Republican senators do no favor outright obstruction, due to the president's unusually strong approval ratings (65%, according to the latest Gallup reading). The public image of the Republican party also remains very negative.
Lack of unity. Republican leaders doubt whether they can achieve the unity necessary to block the bill in the Senate. The party holds just 41 seats in the chamber, and would need both iron discipline and defections from the Democratic side to have a plausible chance of success. Given that at least ten Republicans favor some sort of stimulus measure, an attempt to block the bill might turn into an embarrassing debacle.
Republican stimulus sympathy. Indeed, many more Senate Republicans would back the bill, provided that more of it were devoted to immediate economic relief (especially in the form of tax cuts and aid to the housing sector) and some extraneous spending items were stripped out.
Bargaining with Obama. Therefore, Senate Republicans are simply testing the concessions that the White House would be willing to make, in order for Obama to secure his stimulus package quickly and plausibly claim it enjoyed 'bipartisan' support. If he achieves these objectives, the president would be able to begin work on the rest of his domestic agenda while he is still in his political 'honeymoon' period. Republican leaders calculate that Obama is more open to their attempts to shape the stimulus package, for these reasons, than many of their Democratic counterparts in the Senate.
This assumption is almost certainly correct, as the White House is likely to accept amendments that:
provide additional tax concessions to the business community;
boost the housing sector (in the form of a 15,000 tax credit for all new home purchases);
water-down 'buy-American' provisions that would restrict government purchases in many areas to 'US products' -- possibly leading to tensions with US trading partners; and
eliminate some provisions in the House version of the bill that smack of 'pork barrel' spending (eg political patronage spending in the districts of influential House members).
If such minor concessions are forthcoming, the likely result would be a Senate bill larger that the president's highly flexible 'limit' of 850 billion dollars (probably approximately 900 billion to 1.0 trillion dollars) which would largely dictate the final shape of the package approved by the House-Senate conference committee. The majority of Senate Republicans would still vote against a bill in this form, but enough would support it to allow for its relatively swift passage this month.
sources:http://www.iht.com/articles/2009/02/05/news/05oxan-stim.php
The House of Representatives last week passed an 819 billion dollar economic stimulus bill, which was notable for the unusually partisan character of the vote: the entire Republican caucus opposed it, while all but eleven Democrats voted in favor. The Senate is now debating its own version of the bill, which has swelled to over 900 billion dollars. In theory, the Republicans have the votes to filibuster the package. In practice, the administration is in a strong position to secure its objectives.
Weak Senate opposition. Republican opposition in the Senate is potentially a more serious danger to President Barack Obama's economic stimulus plan than in the House, where the minority has little leverage. Senate rules allow a disciplined opposition to effectively block ('filibuster') legislation if it can deny the majority the 60 votes (out of 100) necessary to secure 'cloture' and end debate. However, Senate Republican leaders have not threatened to engage in such tactics -- nor are they likely to do so in the coming weeks, for several reasons:
Obama's intimidating popularity. Most Republican senators do no favor outright obstruction, due to the president's unusually strong approval ratings (65%, according to the latest Gallup reading). The public image of the Republican party also remains very negative.
Lack of unity. Republican leaders doubt whether they can achieve the unity necessary to block the bill in the Senate. The party holds just 41 seats in the chamber, and would need both iron discipline and defections from the Democratic side to have a plausible chance of success. Given that at least ten Republicans favor some sort of stimulus measure, an attempt to block the bill might turn into an embarrassing debacle.
Republican stimulus sympathy. Indeed, many more Senate Republicans would back the bill, provided that more of it were devoted to immediate economic relief (especially in the form of tax cuts and aid to the housing sector) and some extraneous spending items were stripped out.
Bargaining with Obama. Therefore, Senate Republicans are simply testing the concessions that the White House would be willing to make, in order for Obama to secure his stimulus package quickly and plausibly claim it enjoyed 'bipartisan' support. If he achieves these objectives, the president would be able to begin work on the rest of his domestic agenda while he is still in his political 'honeymoon' period. Republican leaders calculate that Obama is more open to their attempts to shape the stimulus package, for these reasons, than many of their Democratic counterparts in the Senate.
This assumption is almost certainly correct, as the White House is likely to accept amendments that:
provide additional tax concessions to the business community;
boost the housing sector (in the form of a 15,000 tax credit for all new home purchases);
water-down 'buy-American' provisions that would restrict government purchases in many areas to 'US products' -- possibly leading to tensions with US trading partners; and
eliminate some provisions in the House version of the bill that smack of 'pork barrel' spending (eg political patronage spending in the districts of influential House members).
If such minor concessions are forthcoming, the likely result would be a Senate bill larger that the president's highly flexible 'limit' of 850 billion dollars (probably approximately 900 billion to 1.0 trillion dollars) which would largely dictate the final shape of the package approved by the House-Senate conference committee. The majority of Senate Republicans would still vote against a bill in this form, but enough would support it to allow for its relatively swift passage this month.
sources:http://www.iht.com/articles/2009/02/05/news/05oxan-stim.php
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